We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain "cheap pseudonyms", something which is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which newcomers "pay their dues" by accepting poor treatment from players who have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues-paying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes.
Introduction
One of the fundamental questions of social theory is the conditions which facilitate cooperation. Repetition and reputation are two of the most useful features. Repetition causes people to cooperate in the present in order to avoid negative consequences in future interactions with the same people. Reputations spread information about people's behavior, so that expectations of future interactions can influence behavior even if the future interactions may be with different people than those in the present. The ways in which reputations spread can affect their ability to influence behavior, and it is especially interesting to consider situations where people exercise some control over the spread of their own reputations, a situation that is common on the Internet.
The Internet has spawned numerous social and business environments that allow frequent and meaningful interactions among people who are relative strangers. This leads to many problems and properties that do not usually arise in other social settings. However, the pliability of the Internet as a social structure also allows for a large degree of "engineering"
which is also more difficult in standard social settings, allowing for the solution of many of these problems, and providing a fertile ground for the application of many tools from economics and game theory. 1 The key aspect of reputation on the Internet that does not typically arise in non-electronic settings is the ability to easily change one's identity; whereas in real life this is a complex process (often involving national governments and cosmetic surgery) on the Internet an identity change may require just a few keystrokes.
2 Thus, a person has a choice of interacting 1 For example, recent applications include the economics of information (Varian, 1997) , economic aspects of evaluations (Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser, 1999) , aspects of competition (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1998) , cost sharing (Moulin and Shenker (1992) , Herzog, Shenker and Estrin, (1997) ) and various properties of learning (Friedman and Shenker, 1998) . 2 Many games, auction sites, and interactive forums allow users to choose a pseudonym when they register. Even services that identify users based on their email addresses do not prevent identity changes, since users can easily acquire new email addresses through free services like Hotmail. Beyond name changes, the Internet enables completely anonymous interactions. For example, anonymizing intermediaries such as remailers and proxy servers can exchange messages between parties without revealing either one's identity to the other (Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson 1999, Rubin and Reiter 1999) . There are even techniques using cryptography that allow for electronic payments where the buyer's identity is untraceable (Schneier, 1996, p. 139-147) .
anonymously (by changing identifiers constantly) or maintaining a persistent identity. This case is intermediate between persistent identities and totally anonymous interactions. In effect, the option of anonymity turns the transfer of reputation information into a strategic variable, controlled by each player, in contrast to previous work (Kandori (1992) , and Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) ) where reputation transfer is limited but not under players' control. 3 With name changes, people can easily shed negative reputations. 4 For example, some health support forums have been shaken by people who pretend to have severe illnesses and other problems. Once found out such people often reappear on the same or a different forum with a new identity and repeat the process. For example, Alice Grady (1998) reported on a woman who claimed that she had an eating disorder and an abusive boyfriend to gain sympathy in an eating-disorder chat group on the Internet. Eventually found out, she continued her tales in other support groups.
Chased out of the eating-disorder chat room, the woman turned up in others, including one for sexual-abuse survivors. She was found out and banished from that one, too, then joined another group. When last heard from, she was dying of AIDS.
Easy name changes make it natural to distrust newcomers, since they may really be people who have just changed identifiers. But such distrust imposes other costs. Grady (1998) reports:
In another scam that dragged on for months last year, a girl [Kim] who said she was 15 communicated on line with parents of premature infants. The 400 or so members in the virtual support group had babies who were or had been critically ill and had spent months in the hospital. . . .
3 Tadelis (1999) considers an interesting model where reputation transfer is a strategic variable but where performance is not. In that model, names may be traded from higher skill to lower skill players, decreasing but not eliminating the signaling value of reputations. By contrast, we are interested in situations where reputations serve not as signals of underlying skill but as motivators for good performance. 4 On the Internet, nobody knows that yesterday you were a dog, and therefore should be in the doghouse today.
Regardless of what drove Kim, her behavior had a chilling effect on a group that had been trusting and closely knit. Some parents expressed feelings of betrayal, and many stopped posting messages. People in the group agreed to provide information so a coordinator could verify that they really were parents of preemies. Some newcomers were put off by the atmosphere of suspicion.
Even with easy name changes, there can still be a fair amount of cooperation, however, as people will want to develop positive reputations. For example, the on-line auction service eBay (www.ebay.com) maintains a "Feedback Forum" for buyers and sellers to make comments about each other, after a trade is completed. 5 As analyzed by Peter Kollock (1998), people go out of their way to accumulate positive comments and, once they have accumulated them, to avoid negative comments. Newcomers can overcome initial distrust by accepting bad treatment for a while, a form of dues paying that is sufficient to discourage participants from changing identifiers. But suspicion of newcomers is socially inefficient, especially in free-flowing environments with lots of newcomers: it would be more efficient to trust newcomers until they proved untrustworthy, if that did not provide incentives for participants to misbehave and then change identifiers. The distrust can be eliminated entirely through a subtle punishment strategy, where newcomers are distrusted only if a veteran player in the previous period did something wrong. That strategy is quite brittle, however, in the face of either a few malicious participants 7 or occasional mistakes (trembles), such as typing the wrong key by accident. 5 Recognizing the importance of persistent reputations, eBay offers an easy name-changing facility, but a person's feedback comments follow such name changes. This attempt to limit reputation shedding may be futile, however, since a person can easily acquire a new email address and then re-register with no trace of the earlier comments. 6 One participant reported that after an accidental snafu, he received a check from the seller for more than the purchase price of the item he had bought, along with a request not to enter a negative comment.
[David Richardson, personal communication, January 1998.] 7 If it were possible to collapse an entire social order with a single malicious act, then it is hard to imagine
In fact, with either malicious players or occasional trembles, we prove that there is no way to achieve substantially more cooperation in equilibrium than that achieved by distrusting all newcomers. Thus, the distrust of newcomers is an inherent social cost of easy identity changes.
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Unfortunately, the obvious solution of disallowing anonymity is problematic for a variety of reasons, from questions of civil liberties to the practical effects on information exchange.
On-line support forums for diseases such as AIDS could not function without some guarantees of anonymity, in order to avoid negative consequences from people they know in real life finding out about their condition. On a lighter side, many users of gaming network sites such as chess (chess.onenet.net), backgammon (www.netgammon.com), bridge (www.okbridge.com), go (igs.nuri.net) or quake (www.idsoftware.com) prefer anonymity, while role playing games depend fundamentally on the disassociation between real identities and roles played. Despite the disassociation with real identities, information about the past behavior of players is important in choosing partners who play at a similar skill level, have a compatible sense of sportsmanship, and have fast network connections. Thus, we must encourage players to maintain a persistent identifier within each social arena without relying on the verification and revelation of true identities.
that some player would not topple the system for 'fun.' Consider such common entities on the Internet as viruses and worms. 8 This is somewhat analogous to the trust-building that must accompany the beginning of long-term relationships. Ghosh and Ray (1996) , Kranton (1996) and Watson (1999) analyze models where individuals form cooperative pairwise relationships that either party can break off at any time. At the end of a relationship, both individuals are randomly matched with someone else, and no information about past behavior is available to the new partner. In order to maintain cooperation in the long-term relationships, there must be a cost to starting over, and the equilibria they find all begin with some type of sunk cost, such as a slow-start where partners play for low stakes initially and gradually trust more over time. Breaking off a match in these models is analogous to changing a pseudonym in our context, which in equilibrium must incur a cost for the individual, to encourage players to maintain good behavior using their current pseudonyms.
In our model, when two newcomers meet their play is analogous to these slow-start strategies. However, unlike these models of long-term relationships, starting over is not a symmetric act in our analysis; a veteran player can maintain a positive reputation with her current pseudonym even if an interaction partner acts badly and starts over with a new pseudonym. This enables us to consider what happens when newcomers interact with veterans, and we find equilibria where veterans extract dues directly from newcomers rather than equilibria where newcomers dissipate value in their interactions with each other. This behavior is analogous to an asymmetric version of the giving of gifts that are costly to the giver but not valuable to the receiver, which can also be used to maintain long term relationships (see, e.g., Carmicheal and Macleod , 1996 ).
An obvious candidate is the use of entry fees (associated with each personal identifier).
One commonly used procedure is a time consuming registration process; while such a procedure may encourage cooperation, it is clearly wasteful. Using monetary registration fees entails no such loss of efficiency, as they are pure transfers, but in a heterogeneous environment may prevent players from using the system, which is clearly inefficient as these systems are essentially public goods with zero or effectively negative marginal cost (due to network externalities).
The conventional wisdom is that there is an inherent tradeoff between anonymity and accountability. For example, several articles in a special issue of The Information Society emphasize that there are real benefits to anonymity, despite the costs that come from reduced accountability , Marx 1999 , Nissenbaum 1999 ). The benefits stem from separating behavior in one realm from possible repercussions in another, and can accrue to whistle-blowers, politial dissidents, people with stigmatized diseases, and people who merely want to keep their purchasing behavior private from potential gossips. The consensus of a AAAS sponsored conference, as reported by , was that the tradeoffs should sometimes be resolved in favor of anonymity and thus that regulatory regimes should strive to preserve the possibility of anonymity. We show, however, that it is not always necessary to choose: there is an intermediate form of anonymity that maintains the privacy benefits but reduces the social costs from loss of accountability.
We propose a system of anonymous certificates in which, for each different social arena, a person is given a single identifier that is unrelated to the person's true identity; however, the certificate provider guarantees that each person will only be granted a single certificate (in each arena). We call these once-in-a-lifteime identifiers. A player using a once-in-a-lifetime identifier effectively commits to having his reputation spread through the arena. Given the option, players would choose to make such commitments and thus achieve the same level of cooperation that would be achieved playing under their true identifiers. If, for example, a collection of support groups defined itself as a single arena, then a malicious intruder could disrupt only one group; exclusion from that group could lead to exclusion from the others. We show that such certificates can be constructed with a large degree of security using standard encryption techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the basic model. Section 3 considers the effects of a fraction of malicious players who thrive on sowing discord among the other players and the related scenario where each player trembles with probability . Section 4 discusses monetary entry fees. Finally, section 5 presents the certificate mechanism for once-in-a-lifetime identifiers.
The Basic Model
We consider an infinite, synchronously repeated game with periods t ∈ T = {0, 1, . . .}. In We assume that the system keeps a public history of which identifiers were paired in previous periods and the actions taken by the players controlling those identifiers. 10 her own strategy and strategies for each of the other players, is given by
where u t i is her payoff in period t and l(i) is the "age" of player i when she exits the system.
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Note that the expected lifetime of a player is 1/α so we define the normalized (per-period) 10 In our scenario, it is not possible to have explicit norms of behavior that are centrally enforced. It may be fairly easy, however, to publish the history, and leave the enforcement up to the actual players. In practice, this history is captured either by monitoring play, such as on the Internet Go Server (igs.nuri.net), or by gathering explicit feedback from participants about each other, as on the Internet Auction site eBay (www.ebay.com). Wherever possible, explicit and centrally enforceable rules of behavior should be applied, and then one can interpret our analysis as modeling the part of the interaction for which such rules are not centrally enforceable.
11 This assumption is made to simplify notation; the equilibrium strategies that we are interested in will use far less information. Also, this assumption allows us to disentangle the effects caused by name changes from those generated by imperfect transfer of information about the history of play. The question of the reliability of player reported information is quite complex and beyond the scope of this paper. For example, eBay founder Pierre Omidyar exhorted users to give negative feedback when it was warranted (Omidyar, 1998) , apparently because users hesitated to give negative feedback in fear that it would be reciprocated. 12 Once we introduce trembles (Section 3) there will be no need for exogenous signals, as players would be able to correlate on the history of trembles. Nonetheless, we will maintain the exogenous signals to simplify the presentation. 13 In our model, players do not know in advance when they will exit. Endogenous exit creates problems of defection prior to exit. Tadelis (2000) analyzes a model in which the possibility of privately selling one's name upon exit maintains incentives for cooperation prior to exit.
14 We will consider only sequential equilibria, for which we use the standard definition (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
Our benchmark for the amount of cooperation will be the average among all the players of the expected per-period payoff,
Thus, if every player cooperates in every period then V = 1 while if every player defects in every period then V = 0.
Fixed identifiers
If players are unable to change their identifiers (eg., if they must reveal their real-world names), the public history makes total cooperation a sustainable equilibrium. For example, suppose every player adopts the following localized punishment strategy (LPS). LPS calls for a player to play C against a newcomer or against a veteran who complied with LPS in the previous period, and D against a veteran who deviated in the previous period. For α ≤ 1/2, V (LP S) = 1 when identifiers are fixed.
Free identifier changes
If players can change their identifiers freely, LPS is no longer an equilibrium, because a player can defect, then acquire a new identifier and be treated as a newcomer, against whom other players cooperate. Another strategy, however, does lead to total cooperation in equilibrium. That strategy, the "public grim trigger strategy" (PGTS -a generalized punishment strategy), has every player defect if there has ever been a defection in an earlier period, and otherwise cooperate. As long as α ≤ 1/2, cooperation is the best strategy while everyone else is cooperating and defection is the best strategy if a defection triggers everyone else to start defecting. Thus, PGTS is a sequential equilibrium. For α ≤ 1/2, V (P GT S) = 1.
Intuitively, however PGTS seems fragile and unrealistic. We now introduce a new element into the model that highlights the fragility of PGTS.
Malicious Players and Trembles
Suppose there are a few malicious players who like to see others suffer and thus will choose actions that cause a general increase in the level of defection. Malicious players make up a small but non-zero fraction of the population, . Alternatively, consider the problem of occasional mistakes by well-meaning players. These may occur from errors of judgment, unstable network connections (a player who is faring badly in a backgammon game may quit the game because of a lost network connection, which could appear to the opponent as poor sportsmanship) or simply because a person mistakenly hits the wrong key on a keyboard. Let be the probability that when a player attempts to choose an action, that she trembles and plays the other action. In the presence of trembles, a strategy defines the deliberate choices that players make, conditioned on the observed actions of others. Trembles are randomly determined after their deliberate choices, so that a player who deliberately chooses D will actually play C with probability , and vice-versa.
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In our model, we need some exogenous variability in the number of new identifiers each period, to eliminate unrealistic strategies that trigger based on the number of new identifiers.
The variability could come from variation in the number of players leaving the game. Instead, we assume that at the end of each period each player 'loses' his identifier by accident with probability and must start again as an entrant with a new identifier. There is no reason why the probability of losing one's identifier should be equal to that of trembling; we simply assume this to reduce notation.
The effects of malicious players are similar to those for trembles, since each introduces a few defections that are not chosen by normal players. In the remainder of this paper we focus on the model with trembles. The analysis for the game with malicious players is analogous. 16 We will be interested in the social welfare for fixed and large populations. Let V * ( , M ) be the supremum of V (s) over all sequential equilibria, with population M in each period and the probability of a tremble and probability of a lost identifier . Define the "stable value" of the game to be
Thus, the stable value is the maximal expected per-period social welfare when the population is large in relation to the error rate.
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To simplify presentation and analysis, we will rely on order notation. Thus, the statement
implies that there exists some c > 0 such that for sufficiently small,
implies that there exists some c > 0 such that for M sufficiently large, |g(M )| ≤ cf (M ).
Fixed Identifiers
First, consider the case in which players can not change their identifiers. The LPS strategy, where players defect against players who deviated in the previous period, is an equilibrium, with no deliberate defection.
Proposition 1 For all α < .3, M > 1 and < .1, LPS is an equilibrium with
16 That a small probability of trembles or malicious players can have important effects is well known. For example, the evolutionary behavior of the prisoner's dilemma is very different with trembles than without (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) while the effect of a few "atypical players" can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria (Kreps et. al., 1982) . 17 Note that the stable value differs from some analyses of games with trembles in which the order of the limits is reversed. For example, with the order reversed, Ellison's (1994) analysis shows that the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching attains
using randomized versions of contagion strategies, while Friedman (1997) has shown that the stable value for that game is 0. The SV order of limits is more appropriate for our analysis, where we expect a large enough population so that at least one error per period is expected. The reversed order would effectively take a limit where the number of errors, M , approaches 0.
Thus, we get the standard result of full cooperation (except for trembles) analogous to that for a prisoner's dilemma of iterated play with the same partner.
Corollary 1 For the game with persistent identities SV = 1.
Free Identifier Changes
When players can freely change identifiers, malicious players or trembles ruin the PGTS equilibrium. A single tremble or malicious player causes mass defection in future periods.
For any > 0, PGTS has an expected average per-period payoff of 0; V (P GT S) = 0.
As discussed by Ellison (1994) , PGTS can be replaced by a "public forgiving trigger strategy" (PFTS) that works for (very) small > 0. In PFTS a player cooperates until the first time someone defects. Then she chooses D for a finite number of periods (the punishment phase) after which she goes back to cooperating. For fixed , however, as M gets large, there will be a tremble in almost every period and this will not be an equilibrium.
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The point of the punishment phase is to deter non-malicious players from defecting. An alternative way to do that is through a "paying your dues" strategy (PYD), which makes it much less attractive to have a new identifier than one that has a history of cooperative action. Essentially, it rewards positive reputations rather than punishing negative reputations. Under PYD, when an entrant meets a compliant veteran (non-entrant) the entrant chooses C and the veteran chooses D. Thus, 'dues' are transferred from the entrant to the veteran, although at a cost to overall efficiency. The dues act as an endogenous entry fee, discouraging a veteran from deviating since he must then change his name, behave as an entrant and pay more dues.
While our prisoner's dilemma model suggests that dues be paid in the form of "defection" against cooperative newcomers in a simultaneous game, in practice newcomers' dues may take several forms. In fraternity initiation, newcomers perform work or accept humiliation.
At eBay, new buyers may have to accept shipping delays (for example, a seller may wait for a newcomer's check to clear before sending goods, but send goods immediately to veteran buyers) and new sellers may have to accept lower prices for their goods.
19 Kollock (1998) reports that newcomers accept more transaction risks in the on-line environment for trading playing cards for the game Magic. After people who have never met each other agree to exchange cards (or sell cards for money), the person without an established reputation has to send his card first; the veteran should reciprocate after receiving the newcomer's card, but the newcomer accepts the risk that this might not happen. 
(Note that to improve efficiency we only require dues to be paid part of the time. This is the reason for introducing the exogenous signal q.) If either player is not in compliance, then both players choose D. Finally, the strategy calls for a player whose identifier is not in compliance to take on a new identifier and begin again as an entrant.
The functionq(α, , M ) is precisely the minimal punishment probability to prevent a player from deliberately deviating and then returning as an entrant in the following period.
In the absence of trembles, for M going to infinity, this equilibrium has expected payoff per player of
. Some of a player's first-period dues may be recovered in later periods if the player is allowed to defect against a newcomer, but there is a net loss of between .5 and 1 19 In a somewhat different scenario, Carl Shapiro (1983) suggests below-cost pricing as a way of investing in a reputation and Benjamin Klein and Keith Leffler (1981) suggest that newcomers could make other firm-specific capital investments such as purchasing advertising. Note that for small , the PYD equilibrium implies an average loss in (unnormalized) payoffs to each player of (2 − α) −1 , which is approximately 1/2 for α close to zero.
Although compliant veterans never deliberately deviate from the PYD equilibrium, the equilibrium includes defections. There is dues paying by newcomers and by veterans who trembled in the previous period, leading to some inefficiency. It is logical that trembling players be punished, else other players will misbehave and claim to have trembled. It seems wasteful, however, to punish the true newcomers, who have done nothing wrong. If, somehow, the trembling players were usually punished but the true newcomers usually were not, such an outcome would have value V (s) = 1 − O( ) and a stable value of 1 even though previous period deviants cannot be distinguished from this period's true newcomers.
It is, in fact, possible, to do somewhat better than the PYD equilibrium. For example, consider a variant that omits the dues for newcomers in any period following one where there are no deviations. This strategy yields an equilibrium, but for fixed , as M gets large there will almost always be at least one deviation, so the improvement over PYD is only O(e − M ).
More generally, there may be ways to condition the payoffs for newcomers in the next period on the collective behavior of veterans in the previous period (more dues next period if more deviation this period). This increases the fraction of the total dues paid by tremblers (as opposed to true newcomers). Our next proposition, however, shows that no equilibrium yields significantly higher payoffs than PYD. Thus, while there can be improvements over the PYD equilibrium, the improvements are slight and the bound for the stable value given in Corollary 2 is tight.
The key ideas in the proof are:
1) Although an equilibrium can have unusual behavior for special periods or special players, on average, veterans must receive expected payoffs that are sufficiently larger than the entrants' payoffs to prevent someone from defecting and then returning in the following period as a new entrant. (See lemma 2 in the proof).
2) The "most efficient" (i.e., with the fewest defections) way to create a differential between the value of being a veteran rather than an entrant is by having a veteran defect against an entrant, since this "transfers" utility from the entrants to the veterans. (See lemma 5 in the proof). Thus, the stable value is precisely what was obtained from the PYD equilibrium.
Corollary 3 For the game with impersistent identities
This shows that there is no fully efficient "stable" equilibrium when identities are not persistent and PYD has the highest payoffs (to within O( ) + O(1/M )) of any equilibrium strategy. One further implication of the two ideas behind the proof is that any equilibrium with approximately as much cooperation as PYD must have almost all its defections be by veterans against entrants. Thus, although the PYD equilbrium is not unique, all other equilibria that achieve near maximum efficiency must operate in the same spirit that PYD does, with veterans defecting against entrants. In particular, slow-start schemes where newcomers initially play low stakes games until they build reputations would be less efficient than schemes that transfer utility from newcomers to veterans.
Payments for Identifiers
The simplest method to attain full efficiency in the game with impersistent identities and either malicious players or trembles is to make dues paying explicit, such as with the imposition of an entry fee. 20 It is easy to see that if such a fee is chosen appropriately then players will have a sufficient incentive not to defect from the equilibrium and begin again with a new identifier, as they would then incur a new entry fee.
Suppose that the entry fees collected in period t+1 are distributed evenly among all the players who participated in period t. Since such a fee is purely a transfer it does not impact efficiency. If each player uses, in expectation, the same number of identifiers, then each player will, in expectation, collect back exactly the amount of her entry fee. Players who change identifiers deliberately would increase the amount that other players collect in distributions. Thus, if an equilibrium strategy calls for a player not to change identifiers deliberately, the entry fee would not impact that player's willingness to participate.
While attractive, this scheme suffers from two problems. First, the redistribution payments may introduce incentives for players to stay in the game beyond the time when their natural interest or life circumstances change. Thus, redistribution of entry fees would invalidate our modeling of the exit process as exogenous. Even without this problem, this solution does not work if players' expected lifetimes are heterogeneous. For example, some players may know that they have a short attention span and thus don't expect to be in the system long enough to recoup their entry fee.
These problems can be eliminated if entry fees are not redistributed to the players (perhaps they are given to charity, or kept as profit by an entity running the environment). If, however, player payoffs are heterogeneous, such fees will introduce inefficiency: some players will choose not to participate.
To make this argument explicitly, consider a variation of the game with impersistent identities in which players' varying wealth causes them to value money differently, as modeled by a parameter λ ∈ (0, 1]. The expected payoff for a player with intensity λ is
where F is the entry fee. Our point is easily made when α = .1, and players' intensities are i.i.d. with λ = 1 (the poor players) with probability p and λ = 0.01 (the wealthy players) with probability 1 − p. It is clear that in this case, the entry fee must be sufficiently large to prevent the wealthy players from deviating, but this will deter the other players from entering, thereby leading to efficiency losses. More generally, the optimal entry fee will often exclude some players yet still be insufficient to deter the wealthiest players from defecting. A similar problem occurs if players have heterogeneous payoffs in the game rather than heterogeneous value for money; in that case, the optimal dues for a PYD equilibrium would also exclude some players from the game yet be insufficient to deter some others from defecting regularly. The problem of large fixed costs deterring some entrants is well known in the economics literature, but standard solutions such as price discrimination or two-part tariffs are not applicable here.
Identifier Commitments
We now describe an implementable system which achieves full efficiency even in the presence of heterogeneous payoffs, by allowing players to credibly commit not to change identifiers, still without revealing their true identities. As a starting point, suppose that there were an intermediary, trusted by all players. 21 The intermediary assigns identifiers to players when they request them, but promises never to reveal which players received which identifiers.
Suppose that the intermediary also offers a special class of identifiers, which we call once-ina-lifetime identifiers but for each social arena will issue at most one such identifier to each player. A player with a once-in-a-lifetime identifier is not prevented from returning with a regular identifier, although regular identifiers may be viewed with suspicion by other players.
Any equilibrium strategy vector for the game where identifiers are fixed can be extended to a strategy vector for the game where players have the option of using once-in-a-lifetime identifiers. Players choose D against regular identifiers and follow the original strategy against once-in-a-lifetime identifiers. Since regular identifiers are treated so poorly, use of a once-in-a-lifetime identifier effectively signals a commitment to keep using that identifier rather than returning anonymously. Conversely, a player who does not use a once-in-alifetime identifier (i.e., does not make an identifier commitment) signals that she is not trustworthy. In equilibrium, no one uses regular identifiers.
In particular, LPS (defect against anyone who deviated in the previous period) extends to an equilibrium with nearly complete cooperation (only trembles are punished). Note also that even if players differ in the intensity of their payoffs, this remains an equilibrium with full participation and full cooperation, unlike entry fees, which might exclude some players from participating. Thus we note that in this game the stable value is 1.
In this scenario, the players have to trust the intermediary not to reveal their true identities, even though the intermediary knows the mapping between players and identifiers. We can reduce the trust requirement somewhat through a cryptographic technique known as blind signatures (Schneier, p. 112-114). 22 The protocol, though it would actually be implemented using encrypted electronic communications, is easiest to describe with an analogy to carbon paper and envelopes. Player A signs the outside of an envelope with her true signature. A then types up a letter specifying a new once-in-a-lifetime identifier for herself and puts it in the envelope together with a piece of carbon paper. She sends the envelope to the intermediary, who checks A's signature on the envelope without opening it. After checking that A has not previously requested a once-in-a-lifetime identifier, the intermediary signs the outside of the envelope; because of the carbon paper, the signature bleeds through onto the letter. The intermediary sends the unopened envelope back to A, who removes the 22 One of the strengths of the Internet is the ease with which complicated encryption and verification mechanisms can be implemented. For example, Eudora Lite, a standard email program, is distributed free with Pretty Good Privacy, an encryption program which provides a large degree of security against eavesdroppers. It is easy to use even for the novice as the program does most of the work. Thus, it is possible for ordinary people to use sophisticated encryption programs, something that is quite difficult for non-electronic transactions.
letter, now signed by the intermediary, and presents it to other players in the game as proof of her once-in-a-lifetime identifier.
The intermediary never learns what identifier A is using, since it was sealed in the envelope, although the intermediary knows that A acquired some once-in-a-lifetime identifier.
This protocol is still subject to a timing attack, however: the intermediary can watch to see what new once-in-a-lifetime identifier is used in the game, and associate it with the last player who requested one. If players wish to avoid this, they need to acquire their identifiers and hold onto them for a random length of time before they use them.
The envelope and carbon paper protocol described above can be implemented quite practically if identifiers correspond to private-public encryption key pairs. Encryption keys are just long strings of bits; the private portion of the key pair is known only to the key's owner, while the public key is available to everyone. A private key is used to "sign" a string of bits by computing a function of the bits and the private key. The function works such that anyone with the corresponding public key can verify that the private key was used to make the signature, but no one can forge a signature by computing the function's output without knowing the private key.
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Each player is assumed to start with a private key associated with her true identity. 24 To establish a once-in-a-lifetime identifier for some arena, player A first constructs a brand new key pair (a new pseudonym). A sends the public half of the new pair to the intermediary, but blinds it by multiplying by a randomly chosen number (the equivalent of sealing it in an envelope with carbon paper). The player uses the private key for her true identity to sign the request, so that the intermediary can verify that it came from A (only someone knowing A's private key could have generated the signature). If the intermediary has never previously certified a pseudonym for A, the intermediary uses its own private key to sign the new blinded 23 Private-public encryption and signature handling software is already built into the major Web browsers and is routinely used for establishing private communication (URLs that begin https:// usually cause this feature to be invoked) and for assessing the safety of downloaded code. 24 There are some practical difficulties to be surmounted in setting up an infrastructure for establishing key pairs for individuals and publicizing the public portion. A few companies, most notably Verisign, have established a foothold in this business, and there is also speculation that governments may provide such services. public key that A provided. A receives the blinded signed key and is able to remove the blinding factor (the equivalent of opening the envelope), leaving a certificate, signed by the intermediary, that attests that the new public key is valid as a once-in-a-lifetime identifier.
The intermediary knows that A has acquired a once-in-a-lifetime identifier, but does not know which one.
Subsequently, player A can participate in the game without revealing her true identity.
She presents the certificate and signs communications with the pseudonym's private key (not the private key associated with her true identity). Other players can verify that the certificate is authentic, using the intermediary's public key to verify the intermediary's signature.
They can verify that the communications are signed by whoever owns the once-in-a-lifetime identifier, using the identifier's public key. But no one, not even the intermediary, can tell that the identifier belongs to A.
Note that while this procedure involves sending long strings of bits, the transmission requirements are extremely modest compared to even a simple web page. The computational burden of generating and verifying digital signatures is not trivial but comparable cryptographic operations are performed routinely by both clients and servers on the Internet today.
The burden on people is also minimal, as little as a single keystroke or mouseclick to tell the computer to send the once-in-a-lifetime identifier.
There can be different intermediaries for different social arenas, or a single intermediary can handle several arenas simultaneously, enforcing a restriction of one once-in-a-lifetime identifier per arena. For game servers or support groups, this process will prevent players returning over and over again with new pseudonyms, while protecting their true identities.
There is still a danger that a person can acquire several once-in-a-lifetime identifiers for a single arena, if she uses several people's true identifiers to acquire the certificates. If a robust cryptography infrastructure develops, however, most people will be very reluctant to allow another to use their true identifiers. In any case, the need to use a true identifier to acquire a once-in-a-lifetime identifier will impose almost no cost on individuals who wish to acquire just one, but will impose a significant cost on those who try to acquire several. How should the intermediary for an arena be selected? One possibility would be for the official intermediary to be allocated according to some public auction. Once chosen, the intermediary will be a monopolist (we cannot have competition unless the competitors share information about which players have already been issued committed identifiers). The initial auction, however, can compete away (most of) the monopolists' rents, at least for those services that can be specified by contract. Thus, for example, the winner of the auction may have to agree to provide identifiers for a fixed fee, and within a specified turnaround time, or else lose its franchise. The intermediary may also be required to submit to regular audits, to make sure that it issues only one once-in-a-lifetime identifier per player.
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Note that there is still a tradeoff between anonymity and accountability in the choice of how broad a set of activities to define as a single arena. Should the arena in which a person commits to a single identifier consist of eBay's Beanie Baby auctions, all eBay auctions, or all auctions at any on-line service? A broader arena increases accountability, both because there will be more historical data available to assess any individual's reputation, and because a bad reputation follows an individual to more places.
However, the broader the arena, the more opportunities there are for correlating behavior between activities that an individual would like to keep separate. For example, a participant in an alcoholics anonymous support group may not want comments there linked with comments he makes in other arenas and a seller of sex toys may not want to use the same pseudonym for sales of children's toys. In the most extreme case, there would be just one arena for all of the the Internet and hence just one Internet identifier per person. We would expect more narrowly defined arenas, however, in those sensitive areas where people care more about anonymity.
Concluding Remarks
Even in the physical world, name changes have always been possible as a way to erase one's reputation. The Internet highlights the issue, by making name changes almost cost-free.
This creates a situation where positive reputations are valuable, but negative reputations do not stick. It is natural to ask how much cooperation can be sustained relying only on positive reputations. The answer is, "quite a lot", but not complete cooperation. A natural convention is to distrust or even mistreat strangers until they establish positive reputations.
Suspicion of strangers is costly to society. It is especially costly on the Internet, since the great potential of the medium is to allow people to expand their horizons, to sample a variety of interest groups and to trade with people they have never met. It would be nice to create environments where strangers were trusted until proven otherwise. Unfortunately, obvious strategy vectors involving cooperation with strangers are not stable, and we proved that no strategy vector can do substantially better than punishing all newcomers.
Thus, there is an inherent social cost to free name changes. We can mitigate this cost by charging for name changes, but this also requires charging for names in the first place. That may exclude poor people or those who are just exploring and not yet sure whether the payoffs from participation would justify the entry fee. A better solution is to give people the option of committing not to change identifiers. We described cryptographic mechanisms that enable credible commitment to a single pseudonym within some arena, without revealing one's true identity. We expect both techniques for limiting name changes, entry fees and pseudonym commitments, to blossom in Internet arenas. The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to standard equilibrium proofs with some compli-cations due to the existence of finite tremble probabilities.
A Proofs of Propositions
First, consider a single deviation from the asserted equilibrium. The only possibly profitable deviation is to try to defect when LPS calls for cooperation. When the defection is carried out, the gain is 1 as compared to cooperation (for either action by the opponent) but the player's opponent will try to defect in the next period. This increases by 1 − 2 (due to trembles) the probability of the opponent actually defecting in the next period, which would impose a penalty of 2 (for either action by the player). Thus, a decision to deviate will be profitable only if 1 > 2(1 − α) (1 − 2 ) . But for the given parameters, this is never true:
Thus, LPS is an equilibrium.
Next, we compute the per-period average payoff for each player. In any period, some players may have deviated (unintentionally) from LPS. When 2 non-deviators meet, they (attempt to) cooperate and each has an expected payoff of (1 − )
When 2 deviators meet they (attempt to) defect the expected payoff is
Similarly, a deviator meeting a non-deviator gets −1 + 3 and the opposite yields 2 − 3 . If there were k deviations in the previous period, the average payoff per player in the current period will be:
Using the fact that E[k/M ] = in equilibrium, this is 1 − 2 + 2 2 , which is larger than 1 − 2 .
A.2 Proposition 2
For α < .3, < .1 and M > 11, andq(α, , M ) ≤ 1, PYD is an equilibrium of the game with impersistent identities, where
As in the previous proof, the gain for defecting when the equilibrium strategy calls for cooperating is 1, while the loss arises because the expected payoff in the next period is reduced, since the player must return as an entrant. This loss only occurs when q t+1 ≤q.
If the player is matched with a veteran, then the loss is due to the veteran choosing defect (which leads to a loss of 2 utils when it happens) with probability 1 − instead of probability . If the player is matched with an entrant then the loss is due to the player not defecting (which loses 1 util when it happens) with probability 1 − instead of . The probability of being matched with an entrant in the next period is the same whether the player deviates or not, and can be calculated from the expected number of trembles this period and the expected number of true newcomers in the next period,
The expected loss, then, from a defection when the strategy calls for cooperation, is 2(1 − p e ) ). Thus, players will not try to deviate, which increases the probability of actually deviating, if 1 ≤ (1 − α)(1 − 2 )q(p e + 2(1 − p e )), which is satisfied with equality for the value ofq in the proposition.
To compute the expected payoff for this equilibrium, we note that by stationarity and anonymity of PYD we need only compute the average payoff for a period. To do this we note that the total payoff in a period is M −M whereM is the number of defections in that period, since every defection costs 1 util in total payoffs. Thus
is the probability that a randomly chosen player will defect. The only type of player who attempts to defect in equilibrium is a veteran who is matched with an entrant in a period in which q t ≤q. Let p be the probability that a veteran is matched with an entrant. Then
and thus We will show that no strategy vector with average expected payoffs greater than 1/α − 1/(2 − α) can provide sufficient incentives to prevent entrants from defecting. An equilibrium can include unusual behavior in selected periods or by selected players. We establish, however, a minimal difference, on average, between the payoffs of newcomers and veterans.
If this minimum is not met, then there will be at least one player (at least one newcomer, in fact) who in some period would deviate from the strategy. This is sufficient to infer a minimal number of defections in any equilibrium strategy.
First note that for any equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent equilibrium in which no player ever intentionally gets a new identity. Let s be a set of strategies. Define s to be the set of strategies which are identical with s except for the following. 1) If s tells a player to intentionally get a new identity, then s has the player maintain her current identity. 2) In s when playing against a player who would have gotten a new identity in s treat them as if they were an entrant in the most recent period when they should have gotten a new identity.
Clearly, such a change will not affect any player's payoffs or incentives and thus s is still an equilibrium and is payoff equivalent (along every sample path) to s. Thus, if there is an equilibrium strategy with payoffs greater than our bound, there is also one that involves no deliberate name changes (except after name trembles). Without loss of generality, we assume for the remainder of the proof that strategies involve no deliberate name changes.
Define V i to be the expected per-period payoff to player i conditional on the history of play before she enters, (note that we are suppressing the explicit notation for histories, for ease of presentation). Note that V i will be the same for all new identifiers in the period that i begins. Thus we will abuse the notation slightly by writing V t for the expected per- 
The sum on the r.h.s. of this equation is equal to For r, s ∈ {e, v} let p rs be the empirical probability in periods 1 through T that player of type r defects against a player of type s, while p r is the empirical probability that type r defects and p is the empirical probability of any player defect. Note that since players never Proof: This can be computed directly, but it is most easily seen by noting that every defection removes one util from the total payoff to the players. 
